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Abstract: This paper shows that introducing weak property rights in the standard real 
business cycle (RBC) model can help to explain economic fluctuations. This is motivated by 
the empirical observation that changes in institutions in emerging markets are related to the 
evolution of the main macroeconomic variables. In particular, in Mexico, the movements in 
productivity in the data are associated with changes in institutions, so that we can explain 
productivity shocks to a large extent as shocks to the quality of institutions. We find that the 
model with shocks to the degree of protection of property rights only - without technology 
shocks - can match the second moments in the data for Mexico well. In particular, the fit is 
better than that of the standard neoclassical model with full protection of property rights 
regarding the auto-correlations and cross-correlations in the data, especially those related to 
labor. Viewing productivity shocks as shocks to institutions is also consistent with the 
stylized fact of falling productivity and non-decreasing labor hours in Mexico over 1980-1994, 
which is a feature that the neoclassical model cannot match. 
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“If (technology shocks) are large and important, why can’t we read about them in the 
Wall Street Journal?” (King and Rebelo, 1999, p. 962) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the real business cycle (RBC) model, technology shocks are central to the 
interpretation of cycles (see e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999 and Rebelo, 2005, for reviews 
of this literature). However, with the exception of some big oil shocks, it is hard to 
find macro events such as the ones suggested by the Solow residual. Adopting a 
broader definition of technology shocks (so as to include disturbances like policy 
reforms, financial and political crises, weather conditions, wars, etc) could help in 
this direction. Such disturbances, however, work through different economic 
channels. It is hence arbitrary to put all of them in the same basket and assume that 
they all work in the same way, as implied by treating them as technology shocks in 
the baseline RBC model. 
The literature has therefore searched for extra shocks that can potentially 
reduce the dependence on unobservable technology shocks, as well as for 
mechanisms to amplify and propagate these shocks (see e.g. Rebelo, 2005, pp. 224-
227). Simply adding shocks does not necessarily improve the fit of a model; what is 
also important is the channel through which these shocks affect the macro-economy 
(see e.g. Cooley and Hansen, 1995).  
In the present paper, we study a new shock that works via a new channel and 
is potentially relevant for a number of countries, especially emerging markets. In 
particular, we emphasize the role of institutions for the macro-economy. This is 
because it is widely recognized that the incentives to work, produce, invest, innovate, 
etc, depend crucially on the quality of institutions in general, and the degree of 
protection of property rights in particular. The less secure are the property rights, the 
weaker these incentives, and this is bad for the macro-economy.  
Although the importance of institutions for economic outcomes has been 
emphasized by many researchers at both a theoretical1 and empirical2 level, the 
literature has not paid as much attention on whether accounting for institutional 
                                                 
1 See e.g. North (1990) and Parente and Prescott (2000) for the importance of institutions. For a survey 
on institutions, property rights and economic outcomes, see e.g. Drazen (2000) and Mueller (2003). 
Prescott (1998) suggests that changes in institutions are behind the differences in total factor 
productivity.  
2 See e.g. Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik (1999), Acemoglu et 
al. (2001, 2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2003). 
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characteristics, like the degree of property rights, can contribute to explaining the 
cyclical properties of the data within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
framework.3 
We focus on the Mexican economy, motivated by Bergoeing et al. (2002a, 
2002b), who have suggested that in Chile and Mexico institutional changes (such as 
privatization, regulation of the banking system and bankruptcy laws) can help to 
explain the total factor productivity movements, which in turn shape economic 
fluctuations. Indeed, we find that in Mexico the movements in productivity are 
associated with the evolution of institutions. Hence, here we model unobserved 
technology shocks as institutional changes, and find that shocks to institutions drive 
economic fluctuations, by working through productivity as well as through direct 
effects on resource allocation. Hence, as shocks to property rights are identified, as 
opposed to unobserved technology shocks, we give a potential explanation to what is 
hinted at in our opening quotation. 
Using data on the evolution of the quality of institutions from the ICRG 
dataset (this dataset is widely used in the literature on institutions; see e.g. the papers 
in footnote 2 and Appendix B for details), we construct a measure of the quality of 
institutions that protect property rights. We find that changes in this measure are 
related to the evolution of the main macroeconomic variables, especially in emerging 
markets where the property rights measure has a higher standard deviation. We then 
incorporate weak property rights into an otherwise standard RBC model, by 
assuming that individuals can use a share of their non-leisure (or work) time to 
extract from other individuals’ output to increase their own personal wealth. This 
hurts the macro-economy because the possibility of weak property rights pushes 
rational individuals away from productive activities and thus leads to a 
misallocation of talent and resources (see also e.g. Murphy et al., 1991).  
In our model, a shock to the degree of property rights affects the efficiency 
with which factor inputs are used. As a result, the effects of a property rights’ shock 
resemble to those of a technology shock. This is a useful characteristic, because 
economic fluctuations are related to total factor productivity (TFP). However, a 
negative shock to property rights, by creating incentives for extraction, has 
additional direct effects on factor inputs, which, in the case of the labor input, result 
                                                 
3 For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2003) have shown that weaker institutions are related to higher 
volatility in a world sample. See also Bergoeing et al. (2002a, 2002b) and the next section for more 
details. 
 4
in increases in labor hours three periods after a negative property rights shock. Given 
that in this framework negative shocks to property rights show up as negative TFP 
shocks, this model is then consistent with falling productivity and non-decreasing 
labor supply in the data in the medium run.  Hence, it is consistent with the stylized 
fact of falling productivity and non-decreasing labor hours in Mexico over 1980-1994, 
which is a feature that the basic RBC model driven by technology shocks cannot 
match. 
We then calibrate this model to Mexican annual data over the period 1980-
2005. We find that the model with weak property rights performs generally better 
than the model with full protection of property rights (which is the baseline RBC 
model) in matching the auto-correlations and cross correlations in the data, 
especially the auto-correlations and cross correlations related to labor hours.  Hence, 
it is more likely to be seen as the data generating process compared to a model with 
full protection of property rights.  
The model with weak property rights also reproduces the empirical 
regularity observed in the data regarding the correlation between the quality of 
institutions and the main economic variables. Moreover, sensitivity analysis in the 
long-run and impulse response functions show that weak property rights have, 
indeed, a pervasive effect on the functioning of the economy, by reducing income, 
investment and consumption and eventually welfare.  
Finally, when we use the measure of property rights constructed from the 
ICRG dataset to obtain a proxy for the driving process in the model with weak 
property rights, we find that the model with such a shock only (i.e., without an 
additional technology shock) can generate series that follow the actual data until the 
early 90s and then again after 2000. When compared to the basic RBC model with full 
protection of property rights that is driven by TFP shocks (as measured by the actual 
Solow residual from the data) the model that has only shocks to property rights still 
does a better job in matching the actual data for the period 1984-1994. The model 
with weak property rights that is driven by both TFP and property rights shocks 
gives a better fit for the whole period. 
Obviously, shocks to the quality of institutions are not the only shocks that 
matter for economic fluctuations. This is evident in the case of Mexico as the model, 
when driven by property right shocks only, cannot fit the data in the mid and late 
nineties as well as a model with both TFP and property rights shocks. In the period 
during and after the debt crisis of 1995, movements in current accounts, capital flows 
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and exchange rates are also a very important part of the story (see e.g. Chari et al., 
2005, Kehoe and Ruhl, 2007, and Meza and Quintin, 2007), that we do not model. 
Here, we consider a simple extension to the benchmark closed economy neoclassical 
model and we find that this simple extension contributes to accounting for economic 
fluctuations in Mexico and can be useful both in characterizing the nature of (some) 
shocks and in providing a potential explanation for (some) stylized facts.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the paper by 
briefly discussing the literature on institutions and presenting some empirical 
evidence. Section 3 presents and solves the theoretical model and discusses the role 
of weak property rights. Section 4 calibrates the model. Section 5 discusses the 
model’s predictions. Section 6 compares the model with weak property rights to the 
model with full protection of property rights, by evaluating their ability to reproduce 
some key second moments in the actual data. Section 7 uses a proxy for the 
protection of property rights, obtained using data from the ICRG dataset, to compare 
the predictions of the model with weak property rights to those of the benchmark 
model that is driven by the actual Solow residual. Finally, section 8 closes the paper. 
 
2. Empirical motivation  
 
There is a rich literature on the importance of the quality of institutions for macro 
outcomes, using data averages from cross sections of countries. For instance, weak 
institutions are shown to be a significant impediment to private investment (see e.g. 
Knack and Keefer, 1995, Mauro, 1995, and Hall and Jones, 1999) and to be negatively 
related to productivity (Hall and Jones, 1999), income per capita (Acemoglu et al. 
2001) and growth and development (Knack and Keefer, 1995, Rodrik, 1999, and 
Acemoglu et al. 2002). In addition, Acemoglu et al. (2003) have shown that weaker 
institutions are related to higher volatility in a cross section of countries. Evidence 
across countries therefore suggests that the institutional characteristics of an 
economy are significantly related to macroeconomic data averages. 
However, certain features of the institutional environment of a country 
change over time and one would expect such changes to have an effect on the 
observed macroeconomic data, since the institutional environment shapes economic 
choices. We would then expect shocks to the quality of institutions to affect economic 
fluctuations, especially in countries where the quality of institutions is an important 
issue. For example, Bergoeing et al. (2002a, 2002b) suggest that institutional changes, 
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in the form of privatization, the regulation of the banking system and bankruptcy 
laws are essentially the driving force of the total factor productivity (TFP) 
movements in Chile and Mexico, which in turn shape economic fluctuations in these 
two countries. 
To examine whether the data indicate that there is indeed such a relationship 
between the institutional characteristics of the economy and the evolution of some 
key economic variables, we use the ICRG dataset, which is widely used in the related 
literature (see e.g. the empirical papers referred to above), to obtain a proxy for the 
quality of institutions, that has a sufficient time series dimension. To obtain an 
empirical measure of the quality of institutions that protect property rights, we use 
Political Risk Components of the ICRG index that are related to institutional quality 
and construct a variable where higher scores imply better outcomes. We denote this 
variable as PR (more details on the PR variable and the other data used here are 
discussed in Appendix B). We first look at the standard deviation of PR, as a measure 
of the volatility of the quality of institutions. This is calculated for a group of 
developed economies and for a group of emerging markets. The results, reported in 
the first column in Table 1, show that, as expected, institutions are more volatile in 
the emerging markets. This implies that shocks to the quality of institutions are 
larger in these economies. 
We then look at the correlations between the de-trended (using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter) PR and de-trended per capita income, consumption and investment, 
over 1984-2005, which is the time period that the ICRG data is available (we do not 
include data on hours worked, as such data are not available for many countries for 
most of the time period). These correlations are reported in columns (2)–(4) of Table 1 
below. These statistics are calculated for both developed and emerging economies. 
We would expect the correlations to be positive in general, as an increase in PR 
implies an improvement in institutions, and larger for the countries where the 
quality of institutions is an important issue, i.e. where the volatility of PR is larger. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The correlations are indeed positive for the emerging markets and on average 
they are quite high. It is interesting to note that the correlations are positive for Chile 
and Mexico, in accordance with the arguments suggested by Bergoeing et al. (2002a, 
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2002b) for these two countries. On the contrary, the correlations are on average low 
or even have a negative sign for the developed countries.  
Overall, the correlations in Table 1 suggest that changes in institutions matter 
for emerging markets, at least over the last 25 year period. Most of the developed 
countries seem to have established a level of institutional framework that promotes 
but does not interfere with economic activity, in the sense that changes in this 
framework are not fundamental and hence do not affect economic variables as much 
as in emerging markets. Emerging markets are in the process of building up their 
institutional framework, so that changes are fundamental and shape economic 
choices. This interpretation is consistent with the evidence from the first column in 
Table 1, which suggests that shocks to institutions are larger for emerging markets. 
To sum up, although for some developed countries the quality of institutions does 
seem to be related to the macro-economy, the pattern is clearly stronger for emerging 
markets. We focus therefore on emerging markets. 
Motivated by the above, we incorporate, in this paper, an institutional 
characteristic, weak property rights, in a standard real business cycle model for an 
emerging market (Mexico) that is characterized by the above empirical regularity, 
namely the positive correlation of the quality of institutions with both the level and 
the cyclical component of the main macro variables.4 The aim is to construct a model 
that matches this empirical regularity and investigate whether this simple extension 
to the standard RBC model helps to predict economic fluctuations and reduce the 
model’s dependence on technology shocks. We model changes in the degree of 
protection of property rights due to exogenous factors, for instance legal or political 
developments. Such changes directly affect the efficiency with which factor inputs 
are used and are thus in the spirit of Bergoeing et al. (2002a, 2002b). In general, 
examples of positive changes in property rights can include a new constitution or a 
significant improvement of the legal system, while, on the other hand, negative 
shocks may include political and social instability or even a civil war.  
We choose Mexico, because it is a country that looks particularly suitable for 
our study. The institutional reforms suggested by Bergoeing et al. (2002a, 2002b) are 
obviously related to how well-defined and protected property rights are. For 
instance, banks were highly regulated and the government set very low deposit rates 
                                                 
4 Modelling the effects of institutions as property rights problems is probably not representative of 
more developed economies, where property rights are, more or less, secure. In these countries, if there 
is an effect of institutions in the macro-economy, this probably works via other channels.  
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to give low-interest loans to preferred industries: “the banking system in Mexico was 
used by the government as a way to channel funds to preferred borrowers at low 
interest rates” (Bergoeing et al., 2002b, p.  182). This implies a redistribution from 
investors to borrowers; essentially, such a policy “taxes” investors and creates a pie 
of funds available for borrowers. In turn, borrowers will find it optimal to expend 
resources to fight for a share of these funds.  
Moreover, in Mexico, the bankruptcy law in place until 2000 was “obsolete 
and unwieldy” ((Bergoeing et al., 2002b, p. 183). Bankruptcy procedures create 
further opportunities for redistribution when property rights are not clearly defined. 
When bankruptcy laws do not clearly define the rights of each creditor, they have the 
incentive to engage in a struggle to secure as much of the value of the bankrupt firm 
as possible. In addition, in Mexico the government nationalized the banking system 
in the beginning of the 80s and effectively appropriated the bank’s holdings of 
private companies, in an effort to prevent bankrupt firms from collapsing. The 
institutional setup was hence such that fiscal policy may have been used to 
redistribute income from taxpayers to those who had a vested interest in the 
bankrupt firm (e.g. shareholders, employees, etc). The value of the nationalized firm 
then is sustained by taxing the productive economy. Later re-privatization, in an 
inadequate institutional framework, can result in a transformation of these social 
resources (i.e. the value of the firm), to a big contestable prize for rent seekers.5 
Mexico has also experienced political shocks, as for instance those related to 
the debt crisis of 1994-1995. This was due to the inability, and maybe bad luck, of the 
Mexican government to make a smooth transition from the administration of 
President Salinas de Gortari (1986-1994) to the administration of President Zedillo 
(1994-2000). This started as a political crisis that affected the quality of institutions 
and soon transformed into an economic crisis when there was a sudden stop in 
capital inflows in the country (see e.g. Kehoe and Ruhl, 2007 and Meza and Quintin, 
2007).6  
                                                 
5 Obviously, institutions associated with fiscal policy, poor regulation of the banking system and 
insufficient legal framework are very good candidates for shocks in more developed economies as well. 
However, since the channels via which they work in developed economies are more complicated, they 
require different modeling to weak protection of the national output, as we do in this paper. 
6 In January 1994, the EZLN (Zapatista Army for National Freedom -Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion 
Nacional) begun hostilities with the Mexican Army. Three months later, the state party’s (PRI) 
presidential candidate for the coming elections in June, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated. In 
September, the PRI’s General Secretary was also assassinated. In this adverse environment, the new 
government administration by Dr. Ernesto Zedillo was unable to make a successful transition from the 
previous administration. This political crisis was rapidly transformed into an economic crisis, as in the 
last weeks of 1994 the “sudden stop” begins, when the Banco de Mexico has trouble rolling over the 
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There is a small literature on using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models to analyze certain features of the Mexican economy, most notably the 
effects of “sudden stops” and financial crises in rich open economy setups (see e.g. 
Kehoe and Ruhl, 2007 and Meza and Quintin, 2007) by focusing on the debt crisis of 
1995. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) have constructed a DSGE model that includes 
shocks to the trend growth rate in order to explain some features of the pattern of 
data in emerging markets, especially the high consumption volatility, counter-
cyclical current accounts and sudden stops in capital inflows (see also Neumeyer and 
Perri, 2005, for stylized facts in emerging markets). Here, instead, we choose to work 
with the benchmark closed economy RBC model to demonstrate that shocks to 
institutions drive economic fluctuations, by working through productivity as well as 
through direct effects on resource allocation. 
 
3. Theoretical model  
 
We start by discussing the model. We incorporate weak property rights into a 
standard RBC model. The key ingredients of the model are as in Economides et al. 
(2007). There is a large number of identical households and (for simplicity) an equal 
number of identical firms. We assume that households can extract from firms’ output 
in an attempt to increase their own personal wealth.7 Specifically, firms can 
appropriate only a fraction, 1)1(0 ≤−< tθ , of their output produced, because the 
rest, 10 <≤ tθ , can be taken away by households. Thus, 1)1(0 <−≤ tθ  is the degree 
of protection of property rights. This is consistent with the examples of institutional 
weaknesses given for Mexico in the previous section, where a share of the national 
output produced is essentially extracted by the participants in the economy, as 
property rights over that output are not clearly defined. Here extraction takes the 
form of rent-seeking competition. Following most of the literature, expropriation 
comes at a private cost: it requires effort (non-leisure) time. Thus, in addition to 
consumption, leisure, and saving, each household also chooses optimally how to 
allocate its non-leisure time between productive work and unproductive (extraction) 
                                                                                                                                            
government’s debt. The combination of bad policies and the inadequate institutional environment (e.g. 
privatization of banks without the necessary regulation) over the previous years had left the economy 
vulnerable to institutional shocks (see e.g. Lustig, 2001). 
7 There are many ways of modeling expropriation. For instance, firms may attempt to expropriate each 
other’s capital or output, or households may attempt to expropriate each other’s assets, or a 
combination of both. The specific way of modeling “who takes away from whom” is not important in 
this class of general equilibrium models because households are also firm-owners. 
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activities.8 Firms produce a homogenous product by using capital and labour. 
Assuming away property rights issues, the model is similar to the baseline RBC 
model.  
In what follows, we solve the problems of individual households and firms 
and then the associated decentralized competitive equilibrium. Individuals are 
rational. Time is discrete and infinite.   
  
3.1 Households 
Each period t  there are tN  identical households indexed by the superscript h , 
where tNh ,...,2,1= . The population size, tN , evolves at a constant rate 1≥nγ  so 
that tnt NN γ=+1 , where 00 >N  is given. 
The expected lifetime utility of household h  is: 
 
( )∑∞
=
∗
0
0 ,
t
h
t
h
t
t LCuE β                                                                                                                  (1) 
 
where 0E  denotes rational expectations conditional on the information set available 
at time zero, 10 * << β  is a time discount factor, htC  is h ’s consumption at time t , 
and htL  is h ’s leisure time at t . 
Concerning the instantaneous utility function, we assume the form: 
 
( )
σ
σμμ
−
−=
−−
1
1)()(
),(
11h
t
h
th
t
h
t
LC
LCu                                                                                     (2) 
 
where 10 << μ  is the weight given to consumption relative to leisure, and 0/1 >σ  
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
Each household h  saves in the form of investment in capital, htI . It receives 
interest income from capital, htt Kr , where tr  is the gross return to inherited capital, 
h
tK . In addition, each household receives a share of profits, 
h
tΠ . The household has 
one unit of time in each period and divides it between leisure, htL , and work time, 
                                                 
8 This goes back to Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1991) and many others, where individuals decide 
how to allocate their activities between socially productive and socially unproductive ones. 
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h
tH . Thus, 1=+ htht HL  in each period. Further, while at work, it divides its work 
time htH , between productive work, 
h
t
h
t Hη , and extraction activities, htht H)1( η− . 
Essentially, the assumption we make is that the household chooses its labor effort 
h
tη in addition to its labor hours htH , so that only htht Hη  of the overall labor hours is 
the effective labor input. 9 The rest of the effort time ht
h
t H)1( η− , while at work, is 
used for rent seeking, or extraction activities. This captures the idea that activities 
that are aimed at the redistribution (or appropriation) of a share of national income 
when property rights are not clearly defined, like efforts for privileged transfers and 
subsidies, lobbying, bribing, union membership, building up networks of 
connections, etc, are at the cost of  work time.  
The household’s budget constraint is: 
 
ttN
h
h
t
h
t
h
t
h
th
t
h
t
h
ttt
h
tt
h
t
h
t Y
H
HHZwKrIC
t
θ
η
ηη
∑
=
−
−+Π++=+
1
)1(
)1(
                                               (3) 
 
where tw  is the wage rate, tZ  is labour-augmenting technology, common to all 
households, that evolves at a constant rate 1≥zγ  so that tzt ZZ γ=+1  where 00 >Z  
is given, tY  denotes aggregate output produced (specified below) and 10 <≤ tθ  is 
the economy-wide degree of extraction (whose exogenous motion is specified 
below). The higher is tθ , the weaker is the degree of protection of property rights. 
The idea behind the last term on the right-hand side of (3) is that there is a 
contestable prize available (defined as ttYθ ) due to poor institutions or social norms, 
and in turn each utility-maximizing individual attempts to grab a fraction of that 
prize where the fraction depends on the extractive effort he puts relative to the 
extractive efforts put by all individuals. This is a popular extraction technology (see 
e.g. Mueller, 2003, chapter 15, for a review).   
Private holding of capital evolves according to: 
 
h
t
h
t
h
t IKK +−=+ )1(1 δ                                                                                                             (4) 
                                                 
9 This way of modeling extraction activities also implies that the production function of the model is 
similar to the factor hoarding models introduced and analyzed by Burnside et al. (1993) and Burnside 
and Eichenbaum (1996). This will be discussed in more detail later. 
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where the parameter 10 << δ  is a depreciation rate, and the initial 0hK  is given. 
Each household h  acts competitively by taking prices and economy-wide 
variables as given.10 Thus, each h  chooses { }∞=+ 01,,, ththththt KHC η  to maximize (1)-(2) 
subject to (3)-(4), 1=+ htht HL , hththththt HnHnH )1( −+=  and hK0  given. The first-
order conditions include the constraints above and also: 
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Condition (5a) is the optimality condition with respect to effort time, htH , and 
equates the marginal value of leisure to the return to effort. Condition (5b) is the 
optimality condition with respect to the fraction of non-leisure time allocated to work 
vis-à-vis extraction, htη . It implies that, in equilibrium, the return to work and the 
return to extraction should be equal. Condition (5c) is the Euler equation for 1
h
tK + . 
The optimality conditions are completed by the transversality condition for capital, 
0
(.)
lim 10 =∂
∂
+
∗
∞→
h
th
t
tt
t
K
C
u
Eβ . 
 
3.2 Firms 
There are as many firms as households. Identical firms are indexed by the 
superscript f , where 1, 2,..., tf N= . Each firm produces a homogeneous product, 
                                                 
10 Each individual h  is small by taking economy-wide variables ( tθ , tY  and ∑
=
−
tN
h
h
t
h
t H
1
)1( η ) as given. 
We could alternatively assume that each h  internalizes the effects of his/her own actions on aggregate 
outcomes by taking only the actions of other agents hj ≠  as given. This is not important regarding the 
features of a decentralized equilibrium. What is important is that there are (social) external effects. 
 13
f
tY , by using private capital, 
f
tK  and private effective labor, 
f
tQ . Each firm can 
appropriate only a fraction 110 ≤−< tθ  of its output produced, ftY , because the 
rest, fttYθ , can be taken away by households. The firm produces according to a 
neoclassical production function: 
 
αα −= 1)()( ftfttft QKAY                                                                                                        (6) 
 
where 0>tA  is stochastic total productivity (see below for its law of motion) and 
10 << α  is a parameter.  
Each firm f  acts competitively by taking prices and economy-wide variables 
as given. Thus, each f  chooses ftK  and 
f
tQ  to maximize a series of static profit 
problems: 
 
f
tt
f
tt
f
tt
f
t QwKrY −−−=Π )1( θ                                                                                          (7) 
 
where, as said above, 1)1(0 ≤−< tθ  is the degree of protection of property rights.  
The first-order conditions are simply: 
 
( )
tf
t
f
tt r
K
Y =−θα 1                                                                                                                   (8a) 
( )
tf
t
f
tt w
Q
Y =−− )1(1 θα                                                                                                         (8b) 
 
so that there are only normal profits, 0=Π ft , per firm.  
As can be seen from equation (7), when property rights are not properly 
defined and fully protected, so that 1)1(0 <−< tθ , a share of the output produced is 
extracted. In turn, equations (8a)-(8b) imply that households cannot capture all the 
returns to their investment and labor effort. The share that weak property rights 
allow to be extracted becomes then a contestable prize for which agents compete as 
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in (3). This modeling is consistent with the examples of institutional failures 
discussed in section 2.11 
 
3.3 Exogenous stochastic processes for tA  and tθ    
The exogenous stochastic variables include the aggregate productivity, tA , and the 
degree of violation of property rights, tθ . We assume that tA  and tθ  follow 
univariate stochastic )1(AR  processes of the form: 
 
1 0 1ln (1 ) ln ln
a
t a a t tA A Aρ ρ ε+ += − + +                                                                                 (9a) 
( ) θθθ εθρθρθ 101 lnln1ln ++ ++−= ttt                                                                              (9b) 
 
where 0A  and 0θ  are means of the stochastic processes; aρ  and θρ  are first-order 
autocorrelation coefficients; and atε , θε t  are i.i.d. shocks. 
  
3.4 Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) 
In a Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE): (i) Each individual household 
and each individual firm maximize respectively their own utility and profit by taking 
as given market prices and economy-wide outcomes. (ii) Markets clear via price 
flexibility.12 
We solve for a symmetric DCE in which households and firms are alike ex 
post. Equilibrium quantities are denoted by letters without the superscripts h  (which 
was used to indicate quantities chosen by households) and f  (which was used to 
indicate quantities chosen by firms).  
                                                 
11 Fiscal policy in an inadequate institutional framework, which is also related to the institutional 
failures discussed in Section 2, is another example consistent with this modeling. For instance, when 
the government taxes economic activities, it creates a pool of resources, which can be seen as a 
contestable prize by the economic agents. In other words, when institutions are weak, so that it is not 
clear who will benefit from public spending, then participants in the economy will compete for 
privileged transfers and subsidies, tax exemptions, targeted public goods provision, etc. Such privileged 
transfers that are obtained as a result of corruption and rent seeking activities can be captured by our 
modeling above. 
12 Thus, in each time period, ∑∑
==
=
tt N
h
h
t
N
f
f
t KK
11
 in the capital market, ∑∑
==
=
tt N
h
h
t
h
tt
N
f
f
t HZQ
11
η  in the labor 
market and ∑∑
==
Π=Π
tt N
h
h
t
N
f
f
t
11
 in the dividend market. 
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The DCE is given by equations (1)-(9). Looking ahead at the long run where all 
components of the national income identity should grow at the same constant rate 
(the so-called balanced growth rate), we transform these components in per capita 
and efficient unit terms to make them stationary. Thus, for any economy-wide 
variable tX , where ) , , ,( ttttt IKCYX ≡ , we define 
tt
t
t ZN
Xx ≡ . We also define 
t
t
t N
H
h ≡  to be per capita non-leisure time. Thus, the economy grows in the long run 
because of labor augmenting technology and population growth. It is 
straightforward to show that (1)-(9) imply the following stationary DCE: 
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ttt icy +=                                                                                                                          (10d) 
αα η −= 1)( ttttt hkAy                                                                                                             (10e) 
tttzn ikk +−=+ )1(1 δγγ                                                                                                       (10f) 
 
where we have defined: 1)1(* −−≡ σμγββ z .  
We therefore have six equations in the paths of ttttt hyci  , , , , η  and 1+tk . This is 
for any paths of productivity, tA , and the degree of violation of property rights, tθ . 
The steady state solution of this system is reported in Appendix A. 
 
3.5 A shock to property rights: the mechanism  
In this setup, a shock to tθ , as already discussed in section 2, represents changes in 
the institutional structure of the economy that affect the degree of protection of 
property rights. For example, a decrease in tθ  (e.g. in the form of better policing or a 
better legal system, such as an improvement of the regulation of the banking system 
and transparent bankruptcy laws) reduces the contestable prize available to 
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individuals for extraction (see (3)). This in turn increases the returns to legal activities 
(see (8a)-(8b)), thus improving the incentives to work and invest (see (10a)-(10c)), and 
eventually affects the efficiency with which factor inputs are used, i.e. the 
productivity of the economy. This can be easily seen by substituting (10b) in (10e). 
Hence, a shock to tθ  affects productivity, so that the economic effects of a shock to 
property rights should have some of the characteristics of a total factor productivity 
shock. However, by working through the additional channel discussed above, a 
shock to property rights has also direct effects on factor inputs. 
 
4. Calibration and solution   
 
We calibrate the model to annual data for Mexico, for 1980-2005. The data are 
obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook database (no. 81), the OECD Main 
Economic Indicators and INEGI (see Appendix B for more details). 
 
4.1 Calibration and long-run results 
Since income from black market and illegal activities is not recorded in the data, we 
focus on extraction activities that generate income that passes though a market 
transaction and thus is recorded in the data. The examples of extraction activities that 
result from weak protection of property rights presented above in section 2 for 
Mexico clearly fit this category. In addition, we have assumed that rent seeking of 
this form takes place while at work, which implies that hours in the data include 
such rent-seeking activities. Hence, we assume that the economic data include the 
activities and outcomes of rent seeking related to weak protection of property rights.  
We report in Tables 2 and 3 average values in the data, calibrated parameter 
values, and the resulting long-run solution. Table 3, column 1, reports the average 
values of yc / , yi / , and h  in the data. We assume that  
 
[Tables 2 and 3 here] 
   
Some parameter values in Table 2 are set on the basis of a priori information. 
Following usual practice, the curvature parameter in the utility function (σ ) is set 
equal to 2  so that the implied intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 5.0  (see e.g. 
Kehoe and Ruhl (2005) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)). Using working age 
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population for Mexico, we calculate the population growth rate as 026.1=nγ . The 
capital depreciation rate pδ , is set equal to 06.0  (see e.g. Kehoe and Ruhl, 2005). 
Following Kydland (1995), we set μ  (the weight given to consumption relative to 
leisure in the utility function) equal to the average value of th .13 Both 0Z  (the initial 
level of technical progress) and 0A  (the level of long-run aggregate productivity) are 
scale parameters and are normalized to one (see also e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999). The 
growth rate of the exogenous labor augmenting technology, zγ , is set to the average 
income growth rate of the world leader and neighbor USA. This is 1.025, using Penn 
World Tables data for 1960-2002. We finally set 4.0=α , as Garcia-Verdu (2005) 
calculates the capital share in income to be around %40  in Mexico. 
Given the parameters and data averages above, we can use the first order 
condition with respect to labor (equation (10a)) to calibrate the long-run value of the 
exogenous process for the degree of protection of property rights. This gives a value 
of 2464.00 =θ , which implies that %64.24  of the income produced in the Mexican 
economy is extracted because of weak property rights. Also, equation (10f) implies 
that the capital stock, as a share of output is 3775.1/ =yk . This number is lower than 
the values typically reported for developed economies, because the investment to 
output ratio is lower in Mexico. Then, the Euler equation (10c) implies 8629.0=β . 
This number is smaller than the values typically employed in DSGE models and 
results, in our calibration, from the low investment to output (and hence capital to 
output) ratio in the data. The fact that an economy with weak property rights is 
associated with lower investment and a lower rate of time preference is not 
surprising. As said above, the theoretical and empirical literature on the quality of 
institutions has linked weak property rights to lower investment and shorter time 
horizons.  
Table 3 reports the resulting long-run solution. Among other things, the long-
run solution gives 6475.0=η . Thus, in the long run of our economy, individual 
agents allocate only %75.64  of their effort time to productive work, while the rest 
                                                 
13 As said above, we assume that extraction activities take place while at work, so that the employment 
data contain extraction time as well. Leisure then is the remainder of the time endowment, net of both 
extraction and work activities. Therefore, tH  and hence tt HL −= 1 , are observable, even though the 
breakdown of hours data to productive work and rent seeking activities is not observed. Following 
Kydland (1995), the weight given to leisure in the utility function, μ−1 , should reflect the average 
leisure time in the data, which can be calculated using hours data. In other words, assuming that 
employment statistics contain extraction allows us to use Kydland’s approach for Mexican data. 
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goes to extractive activities. As a result, they grab %64.24  of the economy’s 
income.14 
 
4.2 Linearized Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium 
We linearize (10a)-(10f) around the long-run solution (see Appendix A for the long 
run). Define )ln(lnˆ xxx tt −≡ , where x  is the model consistent long-run value of a 
variable tx . It is then straightforward to show that the linearized DCE is a system 
[ ]0ˆˆˆˆ 011011 =+++ ++ zBzBxAxAE tttt , where [ ]′≡ ttttttt khycix ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ ,ˆˆ η , [ ]′≡ ttt Az θˆ,ˆˆ  and 
0101  ,,, BBAA  are constant matrices of dimension 66x , 66x , 26x  and 26x  
respectively. The elements of tzˆ  follow the )1(AR  processes in (9a)-(9b). Thus, we 
have a linear first-order stochastic difference equation system in six variables, out of 
which one is predetermined ( tkˆ ) and five are jump )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( ttttt hyci η . To solve it, we 
use the solution methodology in Klein (2000). We report that, when we use the 
calibrated values in Table 1, all eigenvalues are real and there is one eigenvalue with 
absolute value less than one, so that the model exhibits saddle-path stability.    
 
5. Predictions of the model 
 
In this section we examine the long run implications of the model and its dynamic 
responses after temporary shocks. This will help to contextualize the workings of the 
model relative to the relevant theoretical literature and empirical evidence. 
 
5.1 Long-run effects of institutions 
We first evaluate qualitatively the model, by comparing its long-run predictions to 
empirical evidence. A sensitivity analysis of the long run solution with respect to 
changes in the degree of violation of property rights, 0θ , can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
We first observe that weaker property rights (measured by a higher value of 
0θ ) work as a disincentive for productive activities, as they result in a lower fraction 
                                                 
14 Note that previous estimates of the size of rent seeking activities for both industrialized and 
developing countries, based on partial equilibrium and proxy calculations, (see e.g. Mueller, 2003, p. 
355, for a review) have provided similarly high or even higher results.   
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of effort time allocated to productive work, n , lower productive time, nh , and lower 
investment. Therefore, worse incentives result in lower output being produced. 
These features are consistent with the empirical evidence using averages from a 
number of countries, as discussed in section 2, namely that weaker institutions are 
related to a misallocation of resources, lower investment and output. Worse 
institutions are bad for macroeconomic outcomes. 
The above movements also imply a lower capital to output ratio, a fall in the 
investment to output ratio and an increase in the consumption to output ratio. 
Importantly, an increase in 0θ  implies a decrease in both leisure time and 
consumption, which, via equation (2) results in a fall in utility in the long run. 
Therefore, worse institutions are also bad for welfare.  
 
5.2 Impulse response functions for Mexico 
We next compute the responses of the key endogenous variables (measured as 
deviations from their model-consistent long run value) to unit shocks to the 
exogenous processes of aggregate productivity ( tA ), and degree of protection of 
property rights ( tθ ).15 We also include the reactions of the interest rate (denoted as 
rk ), the wage rate (denoted as w ) and labor productivity (denoted as hy / ), as they 
reflect incentives for the households to invest and work, and therefore help to 
explain the movement of the key endogenous variables. Results are reported in 
Figures 2a and 2b respectively. 
 
[Figures 2a and 2b here] 
 
Figure 2a reports the effects of a temporary shock to aggregate productivity, 
tA . An increase in tA  increases income and this supports a rise in both current and - 
via consumption smoothing - future consumption. Since leisure is also a normal 
good, both current and future leisure have the tendency to follow consumption, 
namely to rise (or equivalently th  to fall). Nevertheless, a higher tA  also raises labor 
productivity, the real wage, as well as the contestable prize for rent-seekers (via the 
increase in output). This, in turn, creates a substitution effect that works in opposite 
                                                 
15 These responses have been generated assuming autocorrelation coefficients for the exogenous 
processes such that the model generated data match the persistence of output in the data (see the next 
section for more details). 
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direction by increasing the total non-leisure time, th . Here, the latter effect 
dominates, so that the net effect on th  is positive. This is as in most of the literature 
(see e.g. Kollintzas and Vassilatos, 2000, as well as the references cited therein). Note 
that in our case the substitution effect is enhanced by the presence of the contestable 
prize. On the other hand, an increase in tA  has two opposite effects on tη . Namely, a 
negative one, which, through the increase in the contestable prize, makes private 
agents more aggressive leading them to allocate more time to extraction activities, 
and a positive one, via the increase in labor productivity. In our model, these two 
opposite effects completely cancel out, so that the net effect of tA  on tη  is zero (see 
equation (10b)). Naturally, the total efforts, allocated to both productive work and 
extraction activities, tt hη  and tt h)1( η−  respectively, increase. 
Figure 2b reports the effects of a temporary deterioration in the protection of 
property rights (i.e. a positive shock to tθ ). These much resemble a negative 
productivity shock, although the responses display richer behavior, and in the case 
of th  a non-monotonic reaction. Concerning th , an increase in tθ  affects it through 
two channels. On one hand, since the deterioration in property rights works as a 
negative productivity shock, this, as explained above, tends to decrease th  (as well as 
consumption, investment, output, capital, and wages). On the other hand, extraction 
becomes more productive. This tends to increase th . The former effect is stronger 
initially, making th  decrease, but three periods after the shock the latter effect 
dominates. All these combined lead to the observed non-monotonic response of th . 
Concerning effort allocated to productive work, an increase in tθ  exerts a negative 
effect on tη . This happens because both the reduction in labour productivity and the 
improvement of the extraction effectiveness tend to decrease tη . 
The movements in tη  and th  after a shock to property rights are useful in 
helping to understand how extraction activities ( tη ) in this model differ to labor 
hoarding in the models analyzed by e.g. Burnside et al. (1993) and Burnside and 
Eichenbaum (1996). If tη  was unobserved labor capacity utilization, it would be 
picked up by measured productivity (the standard Solow residual). Then, falls in tη  
(and hence falls in measured productivity) would imply that firms want to use less 
labor. In this case, they should want to decrease labor demand ( th ) as well, so that th  
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should follow the movements of tη  (see e.g. the impulse response analysis in 
Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996), p. 1168-1169). Hence, labor hoarding models 
cannot be consistent with falling productivity and non-decreasing th  over the 
medium run.  
On the contrary, the impulse response analysis above shows that in our 
model, an increase in tθ  (which would be picked up as decreases in measured 
productivity) results in tη  and th  moving in opposite directions after the first three 
periods (see Figure 2b). In other words, lower productivity (and lower labor capacity 
utilization) can be consistent in our model with increased th  over the medium run.  
Actually, as shown above in sub-section 5.1, a permanent deterioration in the degree 
of property rights (and hence a permanent deterioration in productivity), in the form 
of an increase in 0θ , results in higher h in the long run. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
This difference in the behavior of th  in the medium run is important as it 
makes our model consistent with the Mexican experience in labor hours. As noted by 
Bergoeing et al. (2002b), labor hoarding models cannot account for the Mexican 
experience of falling productivity for a sustained period that is not accompanied by a 
decreasing labor input. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 3, there has been a 
continuous drop in TFP in Mexico over the 80s and until the mid-90s, whereas at the 
same time, labor hours have not decreased (see also figure 14 in Bergoeing et al., 
2002b).16 These movements cannot be explained by either the basic RBC model or 
labor hoarding models, which predict that labor hours should follow TFP. On the 
contrary, in the model of extraction activities triggered by weak property rights that 
we have presented here, sustained lower productivity (and lower labor capacity 
utilization) can be consistent with non-decreasing th , if this decrease in productivity 
has resulted from a deterioration in institutions. Indeed, as we discuss later, the 
model with weak property rights does much better in capturing the th  series for 
Mexico than the basic RBC model with full protection of property rights. 
 
                                                 
16 The TFP series here is obtained as the Solow residual from a standard neoclassical production 
function. See the Appendix for more details regarding the data and the construction of the TFP series. 
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6. Property rights and second moment evaluation 
 
To evaluate the usefulness of allowing for weak property rights in a standard RBC 
model, we compare the model with weak property rights to the model with full 
protection of property rights, by examining whether the second moments of the 
model generated data match those of the actual data for Mexico. We focus on the 
main aggregate macro variables ttt icy  , ,  and th  for which data are available over the 
period 1980-2005 (see Appendix B for details on the data). Note that the model with 
full protection of property rights can be obtained from the model developed here by 
simply “switching off” property rights problems, that is 0=tθ  and hence 1=tη  at 
all t . Hence, what we define here as the model with full protection of property 
rights, is the basic RBC model (see e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999). 
Our main aim is to investigate whether shocks to the protection of property 
rights help the model generate some key business cycle statistics observed in the 
data. In order to obtain a benchmark, we first evaluate the fit of the model with full 
protection of property rights vis-à-vis the data. We then evaluate the fit of the model 
with weak property rights. In particular, we examine whether treating property 
rights as the exogenous driving process for the model, without additional 
productivity shocks, suffices for the model to match the data well enough for 
property rights to be a plausible driving force. In addition, we investigate whether 
there can be improvements regarding the model fit  - relative to the RBC model – by 
allowing for weak property rights.  
In order to get the cyclical component of the series, we take logarithms and 
apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 100 for both the 
simulated and the actual data. We study the volatility, persistence and co-movement 
properties of the key variables. To obtain the model-predicted moments, we simulate 
the model 1000 times and present the sample average of the statistics along with the 
90% confidence interval. We then calculate the statistics from the actual data and 
examine whether the actual data statistics are within the bands predicted by the 
model (see e.g. Canova, 2007, chapter 7). Table 5 below summarizes the results for 
standard deviation while Figures 4 and 5 below present the autocorrelation functions 
(ACFs) and cross-correlation functions (CCFs). 
We start with the model with full protection of property rights. Note that the 
exogenous process for the basic RBC model is the TFP process in (9a). We estimate 
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the persistence and standard deviation of the unobservable technology process in 
(9a) by calculating the Solow residual for this model and estimating the relevant 
AR(1) process (see Appendix B for details). The results, reported in Table 4, show 
that 914.0=Aρ  and 025.0=Aσ .17 Given these, as can be seen in Table 5 below and 
with the exception of the relative volatility of consumption, the baseline RBC model 
is not doing qualitatively badly with respect to volatility vis-à-vis the data, as the 
simulated relative standard deviations are qualitatively similar to those of the actual 
data and the standard deviation of income is quantitatively similar to the data as 
well. Regarding consumption, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) show that a DSGE model 
with shocks to the trend growth rate can reproduce this feature of the data. 
 
[Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
The picture is not as good, however, when looking at ACFs and CCFs for the 
basic RBC model, in Figures 4a and 4b below. In general, the RBC model tends to 
overestimate the persistence and cross-correlations of ttt icy  , ,  and the persistence of 
th  relative to those in the data, as the data statistics are generally at the lower bound 
or below the 90% confidence interval of the model generated statistics. The 
predictions are clearly off with respect to the cross-correlation functions of labor 
hours with the other endogenous variables. The basic RBC model, driven by TFP 
shocks, cannot match the second moments of th .  
 
[Figures 4a-4b here] 
  
We then move on to the model with weak property rights. To illustrate the 
importance of weak property rights we consider the extreme scenario where the only 
shocks that hit the model economy are shocks to property rights. Thus, we shut 
down TFP shocks for this exercise. Since tθ  is unobservable, we choose θρ  and θσ  
so that the generated series for income match the first order autocorrelation and 
standard deviation of the actual series for income. Hence, having captured the basic 
second moments for income by both the basic RBC model and the model where 
property rights are the only exogenous force, we can evaluate the performance of the 
                                                 
17 These also imply that the basic RBC model essentially matches the standard deviation and the first 
order autocorrelation coefficient of output in the data. 
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two models with respect to the second moments for the rest of the variables. 
Matching the persistence and volatility of income in the data is achieved for 
7.0=θρ  and 1.0=θσ  (see Table 4). As we shall see below, using a suitable 
normalization of the PR variable, we can obtain empirical evidence that property 
rights in Mexico are indeed as persistent and volatile. 
As can be seen in Table 6 below, this model reproduces the empirical 
regularity observed in the data with respect to the correlation of the quality of 
institutions and the main economic variables. All the correlations between tθ  and 
income, consumption and investment are negative, implying a positive correlation 
between the protection of property rights and these variables (recall that increases in 
PR imply a better quality of institutions, while an increase in tθ  implies a 
deterioration in the protection of property rights). 
 
[Table 6 here]  
 
The results of the experiment above regarding the second moments are 
reported in Table 5 above and Figures 5a-5b below.  
 
[Figure 5a-5b here] 
 
The relative standard deviations generated by this model are qualitatively 
similar to those of the basic RBC model. Quantitatively, the basic RBC model is doing 
better with respect to tc  and th , while the model with weak property rights is doing 
better with respect to ti . Regarding the ACFs and CCFs for ttt icy  , , , both models 
share the same qualitative features. However, the data statistics are always within 
the model predictions for the model with weak property rights, and actually quite 
close to the model average, whereas on the contrary, for the model with full 
protection of property rights this is not always the case. The biggest improvement is 
with respect to the labor statistics. The model still cannot match the (negative) 
contemporaneous correlation of th  with ttt icy  , ,  in the data, but the autocorrelation 
function and the lagged cross-correlations in the data are almost always within the 
bands predicted by the model.  
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Overall, the model with shocks to property rights only does a better job in 
explaining business cycle statistics than the basic RBC model with technology 
shocks.18 This comparison suggests that it is plausible to interpret (and model) 
technology shocks as shocks to property rights. 
 
7. Technology shocks and shocks to institutions 
 
In this section we construct a proxy for tθ  by using data from ICRG for Mexico to 
demonstrate the workings of the model when the driving force is shocks to 
institutions compared to shocks to the TFP process, when the latter is approximated 
by the Solow residual.  
 
7.1 A proxy for tθ  
Using ICRG data on Political Risk for 1984-2005 for Mexico (see Appendix B for more 
details), we construct a variable that takes values between zero and one, with higher 
scores implying more extraction, and is normalized to have an average of 0.2464, 
which is the long run value for tθ  as obtained from the calibration. We use this 
variable as a proxy for tθ ; hence, we interpret increases in this variable as increases 
in the percentage of national income that private agents perceive as a contestable 
prize because it is not protected by institutions. This normalization is simple and 
intuitive. In addition, when we use this proxy for tθ  to obtain an estimate for the 
persistence and the volatility of the latter, we find that 626.0=θρ  and 09.0=θσ , 
which are very close to the values that the model with shocks to property rights and 
without further shocks to productivity needs to match the second moments of the 
data for Mexico.19 This variable then provides some support to the argument that 
shocks to property rights can be behind the economic fluctuations in Mexico, as the 
statistical properties of the required series for tθ  are empirically plausible.  
                                                 
18 We also report that we have calibrated a version of the model with weak property rights that allows 
for shocks to both TFP and property rights. The results (available upon request) regarding the second 
moments are similar to the results for the model with weak property rights where the only driving 
process is shocks to the protection of property rights. Hence, this model again gives a better fit to the 
data than the basic RBC model with full protection of property rights. 
19 Hence, an alternative way of viewing the normalization for the measure for tθ  would be that its units 
match the mean value of tθ , as implied by the model, and also that its variance is such that the model 
generated standard deviation of output from the model with shocks to tθ  only, matches the standard 
deviation of output in the data. 
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7.2 TFP as the Solow residual and as tθ  
We next move to examine the relationship between TFP as predicted endogenously 
from the basic RBC model, using the Solow residual, and TFP as predicted by the 
property rights model when the only driving force is the tθ process, using the above 
proxy.  The TFP for the model with full protection of property rights is obtained as: 
 
αα −= 1
tt
t
At hk
yTFP                                                                                                                  (11) 
 
As discussed in subsection 3.5 above, shocks to tθ  show up as TFP shocks in the 
model with property rights.  Hence, in the absence of shocks to tA , we can normalize 
A  to one and obtain TFP as predicted by the weak protection of property rights 
model and our proxy for tθ  as: 
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 In Figure 6, we present the log-deviations from trend for AtTFP  and for tTFPθ  
for 1984-2005 for Mexico. Both series are de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
As shown in this figure, tTFPθ  generally follows the movements of AtTFP  , except for 
the period 1996-2000, immediately after the 1995 crisis. In particular, both series are 
below trend in the 80s, improve to above trend in the early 90s and fall abruptly with 
the 1995 crisis (although tTFPθ  clearly falls by much less than AtTFP ). Thenceforth, 
tTFPθ  does not follow AtTFP  for the rest of the 90s. The two series essentially move 
together again after 2000. The general picture is consistent with the model 
characteristic that shocks to property rights should appear as productivity shocks.  
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
 In particular, looking at Figure 6, we see that there is decreased (below trend) 
productivity in Mexico in the second part of the 1980s. According to the model, a 
worsening in property rights in this period resulted in declines in productivity. This 
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is consistent with the analysis in e.g. Bergoeing et al. (2002a, 2002b), as also discussed 
above. Then, as institutions improved in the early 1990s, productivity was above 
trend. The institutional shock of the political crisis of 1994-1995 is picked up by a 
significant worsening of property rights, which is also reflected in a worsening in 
productivity. Residual productivity, AtTFP , increased immediately after the crisis, 
but our proxy for tθ  does not predict this rapid improvement. Hence, for this period, 
institutional shocks are not enough to explain TFP movements in Mexico. After 2000, 
Figure 6 suggests that we would not be far off if we explained shocks to productivity 
by using the PR variable for tθ . Overall, the evolutions in tθ  are consistent with the 
Mexican experience in institutions and, to a large extent, help to understand the 
movements in productivity in Mexico. 
 
7.3 Predicting the actual fluctuations in Mexico from shocks to property rights   
We now examine whether using our proxy for tθ , as the driving force for 
productivity in Mexico, can help with the data in order to account for the Mexican 
cycle. 
 We work as follows. First, we plot the log-deviations from trend for the actual 
ttt icy  , ,  and th  series for 1984-2005 in Mexico (all series are de-trended using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter). These are indicated in Figures 7a-7d by the lines with circles. 
Then, we feed the basic RBC model the actual realizations of the AtTFP  process for 
the same period and plot the de-trended data for ttt icy  , ,  and th  generated by this 
model. These are indicated by the lines with diamonds in Figures 7a-7d. As can be 
seen, the generated series for output closely matches the actual series. This is not 
surprising, given that the Solow residual is constructed endogenously to reflect the 
difference between the changes in output and the changes in inputs, and thus to 
capture shocks to output. The generated series for the other variables are not as good 
for the second part of the 80s, but generally follow the actual series in the other two 
decades. In particular, labor hours are above trend between 87-91, whereas the model 
predicts below trend hours. This is related to the discussion in 5.2. It is a result of the 
theoretical prediction of the RBC model that labor hours should always follow the 
movements in productivity. Therefore, since productivity was below trend in this 
period, so should labor hours be.  
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[Figures 7a-7d here] 
 
 To illustrate how allowing for weak property rights can help with the data, 
we examine the predictions of the model with weak protections of property rights. 
First, we assume that there are no technology shocks in Mexico and that the only 
force driving the business cycle is shocks to the degree of protection of property 
rights, as captured by the process for tθ  constructed with the PR variable. Then, we 
feed this model the actual realizations of the tθ  process, without any further 
unobserved technology shocks, and plot the series generated by this experiment. 
These are the lines with crosses in Figures 7a-7d. As can be seen, the model generated 
data for output are not far from the actual data until the 1995 crisis, and then again 
after 2000. This again should not be particularly surprising, given that, as we saw 
earlier, the movements in tθ  essentially correspond to the TFP movements in these 
two periods, and movements in TFP are highly correlated with movements in output 
in the data (see also e.g. Bergoeing et al., 2002b). 
An important benefit from viewing tθ  as the driving process is in matching 
the behavior of the other three series tt ic  ,  and especially th  in the period until the 
1995 crisis. In particular, investment, over the whole 1984-1994 period, and 
consumption and hours in the 80s are clearly better predicted by the model with 
weak property rights and the channel it assumes for the shocks to property rights to 
affect the economy. The success in matching th  for the 80’s is the result of the 
modelling assumption that agents use their work time to engage in extraction 
activities as well. Hence, these results indicate that one way to explain the 
employment statistics is to assume that they include non-productive, rent-seeking 
activities as well.  
We also examine the predictions of the model with weak property rights, 
when we allow for both shocks to the quality of institutions and unobserved 
productivity shocks. In this case, we re-calculate the Solow residual (see Appendix B 
for more details). Note that this Solow residual is net of the effect of shocks to 
property rights, as captured by tθ . 
The predictions from this model are shown in Figures 7a-7d as the lines with 
the stars. As expected, the predictions obtained lie between those of the two polar 
cases where the only driving forces were either unobserved technology or 
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institutions. In general, the fit of the model in this case has improved compared to 
the model with full protection of property rights, especially for the period up to the 
debt crisis of 1995. Decomposing the unobserved technology shock to a part that is 
explained by shocks to the quality of institutions has helped the neoclassical model 
with the data, especially for the series for output and hours worked. The 
improvement is not big, but this is because the basic neoclassical model, when driven 
by unobserved TFP, does a good job with the data to start with.  
To summarize the fit of the different models with respect to the data, we 
present in Table 7 a descriptive measure of model fit, the sum of squared deviations 
(SSD) of each model’s prediction from the actual data, for each variable. To highlight 
the difference between the models’ fit before and after the debt crisis of 1995, we also 
report the sum of squared deviations for the period 1984-1994 (i.e. for the first half of 
our sample).  Two important results emerge. First of all, the fit of the model with 
weak property rights when the only exogenous force is tθ  shocks (the second 
column in Table 7), as compared to the two other models, improves dramatically 
when we look at the 1984-1994 period. In particular, the SSD obtained from this 
model for the 1984-1994 period is smaller than the SSD obtained from the other 
models for every variable in Table 7. Therefore, assuming that for this period the 
shocks that hit the Mexican economy were shocks to institutions receives clear 
empirical support. Evidently, this result also implies that for the period after the 1995 
debt crisis, other shocks and channels, not modelled here, become very important, so 
that the predictive power of the model with shocks to property rights only is 
reduced.  However, we still get a better fit for the series for hours for the whole 
period by assuming that TFP shocks are shocks to the quality of institutions. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
Secondly, allowing for a part of the unobserved TFP shock in the data to 
come from shocks to institutions, as we do to obtain the results in column 3, 
generally improves the fit of the neoclassical model (compare column 3 to column 1).  
With the exception of consumption and investment for the whole period and 
investment for the 1984-1994 period, the SSD in column 3 is smaller than the SSD in 
column 1. Hence, there are gains by allowing for shocks to institutions, even if these 
are not the only exogenous force driving the economy. 
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The model with property right shocks only cannot fit the data in the mid and 
late nineties. Essentially, there is a structural break in the predictive power of the 
model, suggesting that the effect of shocks to the quality of institutions on economic 
fluctuations for that period is overshadowed by other shocks.  In the period during 
and after the debt crisis of 1995, movements in current accounts, capital flows and 
exchange rates are also a very important part of the story (see e.g. Kehoe and Ruhl, 
2007, and Meza and Quintin, 2007), that we do not model. It would be a very 
interesting extension to incorporate institutional mechanisms in richer models, 
especially open economy setups, to try to account for more stylized facts of emerging 
economies. In particular, it would first be interesting to examine under what 
conditions institutional shocks can lead to “sudden stop” crises, i.e. to stops in capital 
inflows in a country. Indeed, the Mexican experience of 1994-1995 suggests that a 
politico-institutional shock preceded the debt crisis of 1995, as discussed above in 
section 2. Institutional shocks can affect the present discounted value of the county’s 
assets by reducing income in the long run, as is the case in the model presented here. 
Hence, when countries face a collateral constraint on borrowing, institutional shocks 
can affect the maximal amount of borrowing (see e.g. equation (3) in Chari et al., 2005) 
and thus lead to sudden drops in capital inflows. In addition, it would be interesting 
to examine whether allowing for frictions caused by institutional problems, like 
weak property rights, can help the neoclassical model match the behavior of the 
economy after shocks in the form of a “sudden stop”. Accounting for the effects of 
“sudden stops” on income is not an easy task using the neoclassical model, as Chari 
et al. (2005) have demonstrated that this model predicts an increase and not a fall in 
output after such a shock. Here, by using a simple political economy extension to the 
benchmark, closed economy, neoclassical model we show that this can be useful both 
in characterizing the nature of (some) shocks and in explaining some stylized facts. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
We incorporated weak property rights into an otherwise standard RBC model. The 
model was then calibrated to Mexico, where movements in productivity in the data 
are associated with changes in institutions. We found that allowing for weak 
property rights can contribute to understanding the Mexican experience in business 
cycles. Therefore, interpreting unobserved productivity shocks as shocks to the 
quality of institutions can help to explain economic fluctuations.  
 31
 The simple model presented here cannot account for all the empirical 
regularities of the Mexican economy. Therefore, it would be an interesting extension 
to incorporate weak property rights, or other appropriate political economy 
considerations, in richer dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setups, to examine 
whether this can help to better explain economic fluctuations in emerging markets. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Long-run equilibrium of (10a)-(10f) 
 
In the long run, there are no shocks and variables remain constant. Thus, 
xxxx ttt ≡== −+ 11 , where variables without time subscript denote long-run values. 
Equations (10a)-(10f) imply:  
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which is a system in hicky  , , , ,  and η .  
 
Appendix B: Data appendix 
 
A) An empirical proxy for tθ  
The ICRG dataset includes many measures associated with investment risk in an 
international sample of countries. These data are compiled by a private firm, Political 
Risk Services. The ICRG dataset comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: 
political, financial and economic. Many economists (see e.g. the papers reviewed in 
section 2 in the paper) have used sub-components of the Political Risk rating as a 
measure of the quality of institutions. For instance, the well-known Knack and Keefer 
(1995) IRIS dataset contains six such variables: corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic 
quality, expropriation risk, repudiation of government contracts and ethnic tensions. 
The disadvantage of this dataset is that it does not cover the whole period we work 
with, as it is available for 1984-1997. Hence, we use the following components of 
Political Risk, available annually from 1984-2005, to construct a measure of the 
quality of institutions: bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability, ethnic 
tensions, law and order, religious tensions, military in politics, corruption, external 
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conflict (including war, cross-border conflict and foreign pressures), internal conflict  
(including civil war, political violence and civil disorder) and investment profile 
(including contract expropriation, profits repatriation and payment delays). 
Essentially, these measures subsume and extend the IRIS measures. They provide 
annual values for indicators of the quality of governance, corruption, security of 
property and overall of the quality of institutions that protect property rights (see 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx for more details on the ICRG 
index and its components). Note how the examples of institutional problems for 
Mexico that our modeling can capture, as we discussed above in section 2 
(corruption, rent seeking, political instability, civil disorder, quality of regulation, 
bankruptcy laws, privatization procedures) are related to the ICRG variables we use.   
Although other proxies of institutions are available, we prefer the ICRG index 
because of its time series dimension. In any case, we note that the empirical proxies 
for weak institutions tend to be highly correlated (see e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001, p. 
1370 and 2003, p. 68). 
 We sum the components (the sum takes values between 0-76) and denote this 
sum as the PR variable, which we use in section 2. Higher values indicate better 
institutional quality. To obtain a proxy for tθ  using the PR variable, we first re-scale 
it to the [0, 1] interval. We then assume that this is a proxy for tθ−1 , the degree of 
protection of property rights. This then implies that tθ  is one minus the rescaled PR 
variable. This proxy yields an average of 0.2755. Although this transformation is 
intuitive, we need to be careful with the units of measurement, as the standard 
deviation depends on them. In particular, we want this proxy for tθ  to be expressed 
in units that are consistent with the model. From our calibration exercise in section 4, 
we have estimated the long run value of tθ  to be 0.2464. We hence standardize the 
series by multiplying each observation by the factor 
2755.0
2464.0
, so that its values are 
consistent with the model. 
 
B) National accounts data 
We use annual data. For Mexico, the data come from the OECD Economic Outlook 
database (no. 81) for income, consumption and investment. We use GDP, private 
consumption and private investment in constant prices and divide by population 
between 14 and 65 to obtain the per capita values. For the other countries, in Table 1, 
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we use the respective per capita WDI series, as many of those counties are not OECD 
members.  
Data on actual hours worked are not available for many of those countries for 
the time period we are interested in. For Mexico, in particular, there are data 
available on hours worked from 1994 onwards from the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) databases (the source being INEGI (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica Geografia e Informatica)). In order to obtain a proxy for th  we divide 
total hours worked by total hours available for work or leisure. To obtain total hours, 
we assume, following e.g. Ho and Jorgenson (2001) that there are 14 hours available 
for work or leisure on a daily basis, as 10 hours are required for physiological needs. 
The average between 1991 and 2005 for this th  series for Mexico is 0.467.  
Since this series is available for the last 14 years only, we follow Bergoeing et 
al. (2002a, 2002b) and construct an alternative series for labor input, by calculating 
the ratio of an index on hours worked in manufacturing to an index of employment 
in manufacturing. Both indices are available from the OECD Main Economic 
Indicators (MEI) and extend back to 1980. This index takes the value 1 in the year 
2000. We scale the index, as in Bergoeing et al. (2002a, 2002b), so that the hours 
worked in 1980 is 45.  We then obtain a proxy for th  by dividing total hours worked 
by total hours available for work or leisure. To obtain total hours, we assume again 
that there are 14 hours available for work or leisure on a daily basis. This series for 
th has an average of 0.46. Thus, essentially, both available series for th  give the same 
average, which we use to calibrate the model. We use the OECD MEI data for the th  
series required to calculate the statistical properties of th  in the data, and to calculate 
the Solow residual, as it is available for the whole time period.  
 
C) Solow residuals 
For the basic neoclassical model we obtain the Solow residual as: 
tttt hkyA ln*)1(ln*lnln αα −−−=                                                                             (A.2) 
where ty  and tk  are defined in per efficiency units terms, th  is the labor input and 
4.0=α . To construct tk  we use the investment series in the data for 1980-2005, 
assume a depreciation rate of 6% and choose the initial value for capital so that the 
average of the ratio of the constructed tk  series over ty  matches the implied long run 
yk /  ratio from (A.1f). The per capita capital and income series are de-trended by 
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dividing by a series that is growing by 1.025%, to obtain tk  and ty . We use the series 
for th obtained from the OECD MEI data as described above. 
For the model with both an unobserved exogenous technology process and 
an exogenous property rights process, we calculate the Solow residual that is 
adjusted for the effects of tθ . In particular, we substitute (10b) into (10e) and 
calculate the required process as:   
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−+
−−−−−−−=
)1)(1(
)1)(1(
ln*)1(ln*)1(ln*lnln
tt
t
tttt hkyA θαθ
θαααα                 (A.3) 
by using the data for ttt hky  , ,  and tθ  as above.   
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Table 1: The quality of institutions and main macroeconomic variables 
 
Country Standard 
Deviation 
)(PR  
Correlation 
),( yPR  
Correlation 
) ,( cPR  
Correlation 
) ,( iPR  
Emerging Economies 
 
Argentina 7.405 0.692 0.690 0.676 
Brazil 2.994 0.199 -0.452 0.061 
Chile 12.817 0.608 0.591 0.686 
Colombia 4.888 0.247 0.433 0.301 
Costa Rica 5.774 0.047 0.117 0.063 
Ecuador 2.272 0.511 0.517 0.290 
Indonesia 9.228 0.856 0.540 0.753 
Korea 4.893 0.315 0.361 0.287 
Malaysia 4.339 0.772 0.774 0.820 
Mexico 2.907 0.169 0.961 0.851 
Peru 10.715 0.216 0.218 0.287 
Romania 9.549 0.081 0.095 0.344 
Thailand 8.360 0.405 0.435 0.341 
Uruguay 6.813 0.071 0.235 0.179 
Venezuela 8.109 0.438 0.179 0.273 
Averages 6.738 0.375 0.379 0.414 
Developed Economies 
 
Australia 2.060 -0.191 -0.404 -0.101 
Austria 2.357 -0.261 -0.085 -0.337 
Belgium 2.335 -0.319 -0.285 -0.265 
Canada 1.961 0.237 0.395 0.407 
Denmark 1.873 0.515 -0.193 0.367 
Spain 6.004 -0.366 -0.280 -0.441 
Finland 2.750 0.626 0.436 0.569 
France 3.277 -0.207 -0.357 -0.261 
Germany 1.316 0.345 0.042 0.190 
Greece 8.489 -0.334 -0.040 -0.455 
Ireland 4.329 -0.188 -0.360 -0.036 
Italy 3.030 -0.143 -0.292 -0.198 
Japan 3.610 0.053 0.234 0.035 
Netherlands 2.361 0.890 0.895 0.829 
Norway 2.380 -0.324 -0.348 -0.276 
N. Zealand 1.658 0.687 0.466 0.449 
Portugal 7.560 0.099 0.103 0.445 
Sweden 2.116 0.257 0.194 0.246 
UK 2.135 -0.119 -0.280 -0.159 
USA 2.977 0.215 -0.053 0.556 
Averages 3.229 0.074 -0.010 0.078 
Notes: icy ,, are defined in per capita terms. A bar above the variable implies that this is de-
trended (using the Hodrick-Prescott filter). See Appendix B for more details on the data. 
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Table 2: Calibration 
parameter 
or 
Variable 
Description value 
α  capital share in production 0.4 
pδ  capital depreciation rate 0.06 
0A  long run productivity 1 
zγ  growth rate of labor augmenting technology 1.025 μ  consumption weight in utility function 0.46 
σ  curvature parameter in utility function 2 
nγ  Population growth rate 1.026 
β  time discount factor 0.8629 
0θ  extraction technology parameter 0.2464 
 
 
 
Table 3: Data averages and long-run solution  
variable Description data averages 
Long-run 
solution 
yc /  consumption to output ratio 0.6985 0.8462 
yi /  investment to output ratio 0.1538 0.1538 
h  hours at work 0.46 0.4129 
n  fraction of hours at work allocated to productive work Na 0.6475 
yk /  capital to output ratio Na 1.3775 
 
 
 
Table 4: Exogenous processes 
parameter 
full protection of 
 property rights 
weak 
property rights 
Aρ  0.914 0 
Aσ  0.025 0 
θρ  0 0.7 
θσ  0 0.1 
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Table 5: Relative volatility, yx ssx /≡  
x  data 
full protection of 
 property rights 
weak 
property rights 
c  1.340 0.691 [0.623, 0.718] 
0.452 
[0.356, 0.548] 
i  5.862 2.925 [2.820, 3.030] 
4.675 
[4.316, 5.034] 
h  0.288 0.226 [0.216, 0.235] 
0.129 
[0.114, 0.143] 
ys  0.028 0.027 0.028 
Note: The columns for the model generated relative volatilities report the average and the 
90% confidence interval below that. 
 
 
Table 6: Correlations between tθ  and main macroeconomic variables 
Correlation 
) ,(   tt yθ  
Correlation 
) ,(    tt cθ  
Correlation 
) ,(   tt iθ  
-0.967 -0.655 -0.999 
Notes: See notes in Table 1. 
 
Table 7: Sum of squared deviations for model predictions 
 
Full time period (1984-2005) 
Sum of squared 
deviations 
between actual 
data and model 
predictions 
Full 
protection of 
property 
rights (basic 
RBC model) 
Weak 
protection of 
property 
rights ( tθ  
shocks only) 
Weak 
protection of 
property 
rights ( tθ  and 
TFP shocks) 
for ty  0.527 2.591 0.503 
for tc  2.243 3.5110 2.742 
for ti  21.754 59.299 26.927 
for th  0.295 0.109 0.188 
 
Until the debt crisis (1984-1994) 
Sum of squared 
deviations 
between actual 
data and model 
predictions 
Full 
protection of 
property 
rights (basic 
RBC model) 
Weak 
protection of 
property 
rights ( tθ  
shocks only) 
Weak 
protection of 
property 
rights ( tθ  and 
TFP shocks) 
for ty  0.452 0.361 0.439 
for tc  1.887 1.266 2.204 
for ti  15.158 9.834 12.253 
for th  0.210 0.057 0.111 
Note: For ease of presentation, the sum of squared deviations has in each case been 
multiplied by 100. 
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Figure 1: Long run effects of changes in 0θ  
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0
0.5
1
y
θ0
"y"
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
-2
-1
0
U
θ0
"U"
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0
0.5
1
c
θ0
"c"
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0
0.1
0.2
i
θ0
"i"
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.7
0.8
0.9
c/
y
θ0
"c/y"
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0
0.2
0.4
i/y
θ0
"i/y"
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.6
0.8
1
n
θ0
"n"
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.35
0.4
0.45
h
θ0
"h"
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
1
1.5
2
k/
y
θ0
"k/y"
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.2
0.3
0.4
nh
θ0
"nh"
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 40
Figure 2a: Impulse responses to shocks to tA  
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Figure 2b: Impulse responses to shocks to tθ  
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Figure 3: Hours ( th ) and TFP (Solow Residual) for Mexico, 1980-2005 
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Figure 4a: ACFs and CCFs for the model with full protection of property rights (basic RBC) 
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Figure 4b: ACFs and CCFs for the model with full protection of property rights (basic RBC) (continued) 
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Figure 5a: Model Evaluation: ACFs and CCFs for the model with weak property rights  
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Figure 5b: Model Evaluation: ACFs and CCFs for the model with weak property rights (continued) 
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Figure 6: Log-deviations from trend for AtTFP  and for tTFPθ  for Mexico, 1984-2005 
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Figure 7a: Log-deviations from trend for actual and predicted y for Mexico, for the 
models with weak and full protection of property rights 
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Figure 7b: Log-deviations from trend for actual and predicted c for Mexico, for the 
models with weak and full protection of property rights 
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Figure 7c: Log-deviations from trend for actual and predicted i for Mexico, for the 
models with weak and full protection of property rights 
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Figure 7d: Log-deviations from trend for actual and predicted h for Mexico, for the 
models with weak and full protection of property rights 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
se
rie
s 
(d
ev
ia
tio
ns
 fr
om
 tr
en
d)
time
 
 
h: data
h: basic RBC
h: θ shocks
h: θ and TFP shocks
 
 50
References 
 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. A. Robinson (2001): The colonial origins of 
comparative development: An empirical investigation, American Economic Review, 91, 
1369-1401. 
 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. A. Robinson (2002): Reversal of fortune: Geography 
and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118, 1231-1294. 
 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. A. Robinson and Y. Thaicharoen (2003): Institutional 
causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 50, 49-123. 
 
Aguiar M. and G. Gopinath (2007): Emerging market business cycles: the cycle is the 
trend, Journal of Political Economy, 115, 43-68. 
 
Baumol W. (1990): Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive, 
Journal of Political Economy, 98, 893-921. 
 
Bergoeing R., P. J. Kehoe, T. J. Kehoe and R. Soto (2002a): Policy-driven productivity 
in Chile and Mexico in the 1980’s and 1990’s, American Economic Review, 92, 16-21.  
 
Bergoeing R., P. J. Kehoe, T. J. Kehoe and R. Soto (2002b): A decade lost and found: 
Mexico and Chile in the 1980s, Review of Economic Dynamics, 5, 166-205.  
 
Burnside C. and M. Eichenbaum (1996):Factor-hoarding and the propagation of 
business-cycle shocks, American Economic Review, 86, 1154-1174.  
 
Burnside C., M. Eichenbaum and S. Rebelo (1993): Labor hoarding and the business 
cycle, Journal of Political Economy, 101, 245-73. 
 
Canova F. (2007): Methods for applied macroeconomic research. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, N.J. 
 
Chari V. V., P. J. Kehoe and E. R. McGrattan (2005): Sudden stops and output drops, 
American Economic Review, 2005, 95, 381-387. 
 
Cooley T. F. and G. D. Hansen (1995): Money and the business cycle, in Frontiers of 
Business Cycle Research, edited by T. F. Cooley. Princeton University Press, Princeton 
N.J. 
 
Drazen A. (2000): Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton NJ.  
 
Economides G., H. Park and A. Philippopoulos (2007): Optimal protection of 
property rights in a general equilibrium model of growth, Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, 109, 153-175. 
 
Garcia-Verdu R. (2005): Factor shares from household survey data, Banco de Mexico 
Working Paper. 
 51
Hall R. and C. Jones (1999): Why do some countries produce so much more output 
per worker than others?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83-116.  
 
Ho M. and D. Jorgenson (2000): Educational policies to stimulate growth, in Using 
Dynamic General Equilibrium Models for Policy Analysis, edited by G. W. Harrison, S. E. 
H. Jensen, L. H. Pedersen, and T. H. Rutherford. North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
 
Kehoe T. J. and K.J. Ruhl (2007): Sudden stops, sectoral reallocation and the real 
exchange rate, University of Texas at Austin mimeo.  
 
King R. G. and S. T. Rebelo (1999): Resuscitating real business cycles, in The Handbook 
of Macroeconomics, edited by J. Taylor and M. Woodford. North-Holland, Amsterdam.   
 
Klein P. (2000): Using the generalized Schur form to solve a multivariate linear 
rational expectations model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 24, 1405-1423. 
 
Knack S. and P. Keefer (1995): Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country 
tests using alternative measures, Economics and Politics, 7, 207-227.   
 
Kollintzas T. and V. Vassilatos (2000): A small open economy model with transaction 
costs in foreign capital, European Economic Review, 44, 1515-1541. 
 
Kydland F. E. (1995): Business cycles and aggregate labor market fluctuations, in 
Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, edited by T. F. Cooley. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton N.J. 
 
Lustig, N. (2001): Life is not easy: Mexico’s quest for stability and growth, The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 15, 85-106. 
 
Mauro P. (1995): Corruption and growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 681-712.  
 
Meza F. and E. Quintin (2007): Financial crises and total factor productivity, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper. 
 
Mueller D. (2003): Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
 
Murphy K., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1991): The allocation of talent: Implications for 
growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 503-530. 
 
Neumeyer P. A. and F. Perri (2005): Business cycles in emerging economies: the role 
of interest rates, Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 345-380. 
 
North D. C. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Parente S. L. and E. C. Prescott (2000): Barriers to Riches. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 
 
Prescott E. C. (1998): Needed: A theory of total factor productivity, International 
Economic Review, 39, 525-551. 
 
 52
Rebelo S. (2005): Real business cycle models: past, present and future, Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 107, 217–238. 
 
Rodrik D. (1999): Where did all the growth go? Journal of Economic Growth, 4, 385-412.  
